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Scotland is due to hold an independence referendum in September 2014, while independence supporters
in Catalonia recently held a mass demonstration in favour of the territory’s independence from
Spain. Luis Moreno compares the two independence movements, noting that while the Scottish
referendum campaign has been dominated by practical issues such as the economic impact of
independence, the Catalonian debate has tended to be more emotionally driven and linked to
identity.
What similarities and differences are there between the Catalan and Scottish political contexts? It is
worth underlining the erroneous prescriptions put forward by the functionalist and Marxist schools of
thought about these two territories. These approaches insisted that both territories were failed national communities
which were bound to disappear. Such assertions have been repeatedly falsified in contemporary times. Far from
being homogenised and dissolved within the British and Spanish polities, Scotland and Catalonia now face a
possible – and plausible – future of political independence.
According to the agreement reached by the British
Government and the Scottish Executive, Scotland is to
hold a referendum on independence on 18 September,
2014. Recent polls indicate that a majority of people are
against secession. Around half of Scots are against
independence, almost a third of Scots are in favour of
separation, and a little less than a fifth are undecided.
Figures have fluctuated in the last months, but have
persistently shown a majority of Scots expressing a ‘No’
vote.
Greater volatility is to be expected as the date of the
referendum approaches. In the period closer to the
referendum day, transfers of votes between the two
camps could be important and even decisive. Let us
remember the case of the Quebec Referendum in 1995.
Early surveys indicated that two thirds of the population
were against independence, but the final referendum
produced a margin of only 77,000 votes in favour of
staying a part of Canada (from an electorate of around 5
million voters). It could well be that a majority of Scots oppose independence because arguments against the “Yes”
vote prevail in the year ahead (there has been, however, a substantial increase in support for independence among
young voters aged between 18 and 24).
Until now, the debate on independence in Catalonia has mainly revolved around identity politics. Nationalist elites
insist that Catalonia is not Spain and does not want to belong to it. The fact that Catalans have expressed a high
degree of duality in self-identification (Catalan and Spanish) is somewhat overlooked in such claims. In the last 30
years, Catalans have reiterated a lesser degree of being ‘exclusive’ (‘I am only Catalan, not Spanish’) than the
Scots. Arguably, a majority of people identifying themselves ‘exclusively’ can be regarded as the sound sociological
basis for political independence. In 1986, a survey was carried out in Scotland addressing for the first time what was
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later termed ‘The Moreno Question’. In this survey, 39 per cent of respondents considered themselves to be ‘only
Scottish’ without any identity sharing with Britain. After all these years, the percentage of ‘exclusivity’ in Scotland has
remained rather stable with a slight increase.
In the mid-1980s, around 9 per cent of the people in Catalonia stated their ‘exclusive identity’. After the ruling of the
Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010, which was interpreted as a setback for Catalonia’s home rule aspirations, the
percentage of those considering themselves to be ‘only Catalan’ rose to 22 per cent. Thus, it can be concluded that
the increase in Catalans’ exclusive self-identification has been mainly reactive and emotional. Greater numbers of
Catalans have internalised the refusal of the Spanish central elites, and in particular the refusal of the Conservative
Rajoy Government to negotiate new financial arrangements, as an unacceptable collective offense. Paradoxically,
and despite the fact that Catalans identify themselves less ‘exclusively’ than Scots, independentist agitation in the
Principat de Catalunya seems to have reached stronger levels of intensity than in Scotland, where rational arguing
about the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of independence have so far developed in a somewhat dispassionate atmosphere.
There is a diffuse belief in Catalonia that after mass demonstrations during the territory’s National Day (11th
September) in 2012 and 2013, an independence referendum would validate the theses demanded by the Catalan
separatist movement. On interpreting such perceptions, some Scottish nationalists praise the ‘emotional
intelligence’ deployed by their Catalan counterparts in order to galvanise public opinion and to further sustain the
momentum for secession. Political discourse in Catalonia has tended to reinforce aversion towards the central elites
in Madrid, insisting in the cliché, ‘Espanya ens roba’ (Spain robs us). Catalan separatists have indeed deployed an
effective strategy of mobilisation by which the in-group (Catalonia) is kept highly motivated in its dispute with the
out-group (Spain).
All of this is aimed at maintaining the self-affirmative popular compulsion of ‘Yes, we can’ for the achievement of
independence. This psycho-social attitude is in line with the ‘demonstration effect’ theorised by Thorstein Veblen as
the means to overcome unsuccessful attempts in the past. Not surprisingly, cultural elements and ethno-territorial
interpretations of Catalonia vis-à-vis Spain permeate most of the discussions, in which ‘new converts’ make
passionate professions of faith after having come out of their ‘independence closets’.
Debate in Scotland has so far unfolded in unruffled terms. Arguably this is a characteristic feature of the homeland of
Adam Smith, David Hume, the Democratic Intellect and the School of Common Sense. On scrutinising the
contrasting viewpoints on independence, an ‘argumentative rationality’ has been said to stand out with the use of
abundant data and sources of evidence. An example in point is the challenge by the Conservative-Liberal
Government to the nationalist Scottish Executive to spell out clearly whether an eventual independent Scotland
would adopt the British pound or the euro as the legal currency of the new country. Such a direct interpellation puts
into question the viability of a sovereign monetary policy in a future independent Scotland. It is worth noting here
that, since the unleash of the 2007 financial crisis, the British Treasury has injected £300 billion into the Scottish
economy as bank rescue capitals and guarantees (an equivalent sum to the total sovereign debt of Greece, which
reached 157 per cent of its GDP in 2012).
To such allegations, Alex Salmond, Scotland’s First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party, has put
forward the counter-argument that an independent Scotland would not be prepared to assume the public debt if the
Bank Of England refused to share the currency with Scotland. It would be unreasonable, Salmond claims, that all
financial assets and reserves contributed by Scotland in the past were to be kept by the Bank of England and the
debt were not to be shared equitably. There is also a constant reminder by the nationalists of the huge amount of
revenue gained by the British Treasury with the extraction of Scotland’s North Sea Oil (which is calculated at no less
than the previously mentioned figure of £300 billion). Despite repeated petitions by the SNP in the past, a Scottish
Fund with revenues obtained from the resources in the North Sea was never established.
It would seem that the Scottish nationalists are tempted to repeat a more emotional line of argument, as happened
in the early 1970s with the rallying cry ‘It’s Scotland’s oil! ’, which provided the SNP with an additional electoral
impetus (support climbed from 12.8 per cent of the popular vote in 1970 to 30.6 per cent in the Westminster
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elections held in October 1974). The ‘Norwegian Dream’, based on neighbouring Norway – a wealthy country with
similar socio-demographic characteristics and natural resources as Scotland – appeared as a plausible case which
validated the independence option not only emotionally but rationally.
Scotland, Catalonia and the European Union
The aspirations in Scotland and Catalonia to achieve national sovereignty contrast with the institutional process of
Europeanisation. Convergence and political interdependence within the EU is not an incentive for internal boundary-
building and the establishment of self-centred compartments of governance, as happened with the old Westphalia
nation-states. Europeanisation reaches across citizens in the Old Continent as a whole (over half of the legislation
in people’s daily lives has a European dimension). For instance the fight against tax evasion, to mention just one
important policy in the context of the financial crisis, would be inefficient if all European countries were not involved
in a common stance.
It is misguided to impede or curtail self-government in stateless nations such as Scotland and Catalonia in a political
union like the EU, which proclaims territorial subsidiarity as the guiding principle for policy-making and
implementation. The impact that the secession of Scotland and Catalonia could bring about for the whole multi-level
governance in the EU should not be trivialised either. Other stateless nations could follow similar processes of state
formation to request political status as ‘full’ sovereign member states. In such an eventuality, who could deny similar
independentist credentials to, say, the Basque Country, Corsica, Flanders or Wales? How many sovereign states
could the EU coordinate in their administrative and political processes?
These issues are often left out of media discussions, but they need to be addressed from a European perspective.
They certainly put into focus the growing inability of single nation states to maintain their power bases. All these
considerations would be redundant if both Scottish and Catalan nationalists were not interested in Europeanisation,
but they have repeatedly made explicit their European orientation and their active defence of the European social
model. These aspects are democratically acknowledged by most parties involved in the on-going debates on
independence.
One last question: why is the silence of intellectuals and experts on Catalonia so deafening? As agents of change,
their participation in the public debate is desirable. They could contribute further to clarify discussions and to balance
out the biased belligerence of powerful opinion leaders and media conglomerates. Their civic duty is to refute the
claim that these matters pertain, and ought to be resolved, within the private sphere of citizens’ lives. In fact, they
concern the welfare of us all, and the future of our societies.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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